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Mr English was harassed by colleagues using sexual innuendo suggesting he was 
homosexual. This conduct was rooted, apparently, in two things: he lived in Brighton 
(a well known centre of the gay scene) and had attended boarding school. What made 
this case unusual is that Mr English was heterosexual, and his tormentors neither 
assumed nor perceived Mr English to be gay. Mr English was aware throughout that 
his tormentors never mistook him for being homosexual. For these reasons the EAT 
found that the mockery did not amount to unlawful harassment on the grounds of 
sexual orientation. However, by a 2-1 majority, the Court of Appeal reversed.   
The technical issue in this case was whether someone could be liable for 
harassment ‘on the grounds of’ sexual orientation, under regulation 5 of the 
Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/1661, when the 
treatment was unrelated to any particular person’s sexual orientation. The outcome is 
relevant to the many the statutory definitions employing the phrase on grounds of’, 
such as harassment (and direct discrimination), on grounds of sex, religion or belief, 
race, age and disability, and gender reassignment. 
There are two versions of the phrase, one narrow and one broad. Harassment 
is unlawful either ‘on grounds of’ a protected status (broad), or ‘on grounds of’ his 
protected status (narrow). It is, for example, the difference between ‘on grounds of 
race’, or ‘on grounds of his race’. At present, the UK legislation provides a broad 
definition for race, sexual orientation, and religion or belief. The narrow definition 
covers gender reassignment and age. For sex, the harassment need only be related to 
her sex, an even broader phrase used to resolve a problem particular to gender (see 
EOC v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] ICR 1234 (HC Admin)). The 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 carries the narrow definition, but this is unlikely 
to survive the ECJ’s ruling that the parent ‘Framework’ Directive 2000/78/EC 
imposes the broad version (Coleman v Attridge Law Case C-303/06 [2008] IRLR 722 
(ECJ)). Direct discrimination suffers from similar, albeit slightly varied, 
discrepancies. 
The significance of the broad definition is that it extends the coverage to 
harassment or discrimination on the ground of a third party’s protected status (e.g. 
harassing a white woman for marrying a black man), and to ‘perceived’ 
discrimination (e.g. harassing an Asian man on the mistaken belief that he is Muslim 
or a straight man on the mistaken belief he is gay).  
The phrase ‘on the ground of sexual orientation’ lends itself to cover the 
scenario in the instant case. As Sedley LJ observed, the distance between perceived 
harassment and harassing a man as if he were gay when he is not ‘is barely 
perceptible’ ([38]). However, less technical considerations were prevalent in his 
reasoning ([39]): 
[People] ...  may desire to keep their orientation to themselves but still be vulnerable to 
harassment by people who know or sense what their orientation is. It cannot possibly have 
been the intention, when legislation was introduced to stop sexual harassment in the 
workplace, that such a claimant must declare his or her true sexual orientation in order to 
establish that the abuse was ‘on grounds of sexual orientation’. ... The case would have been 
exactly the same if Mr English had elected ... to remain silent about his actual sexual 
orientation.... And the same would be the case if he were actually gay or bisexual but 
preferred not to disclose it.  
 
The underlying consideration here is to protect homosexual (or bisexual) workers 
from being ‘outed’ by a systematic campaign of abuse. In such a pernicious scenario, 
the worker would have to suffer the abuse in silence unless or until he ‘came out’. As 
such, this decision helps preserve the dignity of workers that discrimination law is 
supposed to enshrine (see the text of regulation 5 and Coleman v Attridge Law, ibid 
AG[8]-[15]). 
In addition to harassment on protected grounds, sexual harassment is unlawful. 
The Sex Discrimination Act 1975, section 4A, prohibits ‘conduct of a sexual nature 
that has the purpose or effect of violating her dignity or, of creating an intimidating, 
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her ...’ Although this is 
provided by the Sex Discrimination Act, its scope is not limited to male-to-female 
conduct, or the reverse. The perpetrator is ‘a person’ while the victim is ‘her’ or ‘him’ 
(s 4A(5)). Thus ‘same-sex’ sexual harassment is covered by this provision and even 
before the English decision, victims of sexual harassment were under no obligation to 
reveal their sexual orientation. The abuse of Mr English included ‘sexual innuendo’ 
and ‘lurid comments’ ([3]), and so the abuse would appear to amount to sexual 
harassment as well as sexual orientation harassment. No mention of this apparent 
oversight was made in the judgment. Indeed, Sedley LJ (see the extract above) 
appeared to confuse sexual harassment with harassment on the ground of sexual 
orientation. That said, not all cases of homophobic abuse will be of a sexual nature, 
and so regulation 5 and this decision are not redundant.  
The most obvious principle to emerge from this decision is that victims of 
sexual orientation harassment are under no obligation to disclose their sexual 
orientation to succeed. Thus, workers cannot be ‘outed’ by a campaign of harassment.  
Accordingly, victims of religious harassment should not be obliged to disclose their 
religion, and so on. 
More broadly, the case draws attention to the numerous possibilities when 
defining harassment (or direct discrimination), which could be restricted to the 
claimant’s protected status, or extended to cover perhaps, ‘third-party’ discrimination, 
perceived discrimination, and conduct unrelated to any particular person’s condition. 
Various versions appear inconsistently and incoherently across the domestic 
legislation, and those definitions falling short of the broad possibility confirmed in 
English, fall short of the consistently broad definition provided by the predominant 
EC Directives. 
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